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This paper aims at uncovering the di¤erent channels through which de facto -
nancial openness a¤ects economic growth and its components. The results herein
indicate that de facto measures of nancial openness (as proxied by di¤erent types
of capital inows) stimulate economic growth. In particular, the results indicate that
higher levels of FDI inows stimulate GDP per worker growth and crowd-in domes-
tic investment for developing and emerging markets. As far as developed economies,
I nd that higher levels of both FDI and Portfolio-type inows improve GDP per
worker growth, but that only the latter type of capital stimulates capital accumula-
tion with crowding-in e¤ects. The one similarity between developed and developing
economies is that FDI positively a¤ects total factor productivity in both cases.
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1 Introduction
The nexus between international nancial openness and economic growth continues to
be one of the most hotly debated issues among international economists.1 That is, do
nancially more open economies grow faster than closed ones precisely because of their
openness to global capital markets? Economic theory suggests that nancial openness
should foster economic growth; however, empirical work thus far has not found robust
evidence for the existence of such a link (Kose et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the extent
of nancial market liberalization around the world increased almost continuously until
very recently, where a driving factor underlying this process was the increased possibility
for investors to (internationally) diversify risk. At the same time, many economies have
encouraged capital inows by reducing capital controls through the introduction of market-
oriented reforms; for example through the elimination of restrictions on certain types of
capital.
1.1 Theoretical Developments
In a perfect neoclassical world there are good reasons for a positive e¤ect on economic
growth from the integration of capital markets. For example, as Levine (2001) shows,
more nancial openness can strengthen the domestic nancial system, thereby leading
to more domestic investment, to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital, and therefore to
higher economic growth. Furthermore, theoretical arguments supporting nancial openness
revolve around (a) the benets of international risk sharing for consumption smoothing;
and (b) the positive impact of capital inows on capital accumulation; where these likely
contributions to the well-being of an economy can be particularly large for capital inows
with equity-like features like foreign direct investment (FDI). Therefore, it is important
to di¤erentiate between short-term and long-term capital ows; where the latter type
of investment brings with it not only resources, but also technology, access to markets,
and knowledge. As emphasized by Berthélemy and Démurger (2000), Borensztein et al.
(1998), and Grossman and Helpman (1991), FDI can smooth the spillovers of managerial
and technological know-how, particularly in the form of new varieties of capital inputs;
furthermore, it can improve the skills composition of the labor force as a result of learning
by doinge¤ects, investment in formal education, and on-the-job training. In addition, the
trade literature suggests that although higher levels of competition stimulated by FDI may
1The fairly recent exchange between J. Stiglitz and K. Rogo¤, through a series of papers and open
letters, is perhaps the most clear example of the hotness of this debate.
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tend to reduce the revenues of local rms, spillover e¤ects can lower costs and encourage
domestic investment.2 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, FDI is also not as volatile,
and therefore not as troublesome as short-term ows that can quickly come in and out of
an economy.
However, some prominent economists opposed to the free movement of capital ows
have put forth strong arguments against nancial openness. This side of the debate argues
that nancial openness is not necessarily welfare enhancing in the presence of distortions
such as trade barriers, weak institutions, and/or macroeconomic imbalances; or if informa-
tion asymmetries a¤ect the proper working of the international nancial markets (Bhag-
wati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2008; Stiglitz, 2000, 2003). Moreover,
nancial openness might not only have an ambiguous e¤ect on the level but also on the
volatility of growth rates. Therefore, this side of the debate evolves around whether (a)
access to world capital markets expands investorsopportunities for portfolio diversica-
tion and provides the opportunity to attain better (risk-adjusted) returns, or wether (b)
volatility risk, sudden stops, and quick reversals in capital ows, in the context of highly
open capital accounts, may represent signicant costs. As far as the rst point above, there
are potentially large benets as well (as seen from the recipient economy) since as argued
by Obstfeld (1994), access to international capital markets gives economies the possibility
to borrow in order to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks. Furthermore,
the potential growth and welfare gains, which results from international risk sharing, can
be quite large. As far as the second point, concerns associated with such "reversals" have
been heightened by the nancial crises of the 1990s and early 21st century, and although
skewed fundamentals might have played a role in the abovementioned crises, they have
called attention to the intrinsic instability of nancial markets and the risks that the "un-
regulated" cross-border movement of capital can bring for economies without the proper
"rules of the game".
1.2 Empirical Developments
Despite a rich body of contributions, the empirical literature is inconclusive vis-à-vis the
nancial openness-growth nexus. As is stated by Prasad et al. (2003) Theoretical models
have identied a number of channels through which international nancial integration can
promote economic growth in developing countries... However, there is as yet no clear and
2It is also argued that FDI can help decrease a rmsnancing constraints. For example, Blalock
and Gertler (2005) nd that FDI can alleviate the unfavorable e¤ects of nancial crisis by helping rms
maintain uninterrupted access to credit through their parent companies.
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robust empirical proof that the e¤ect is quantitatively signicant.For example, applied
work by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Kraay (1998), Edison et al. (2002), and Fratzscher
and Bussiere (2004) has not found a robust long-term e¤ect of nancial openness on growth,
thereby corroborating the oft-cited study by Rodrik (1998). On the other hand, research
by Quinn (1997), Edwards (2001) and Henry (2007) shows that nancial openness and
economic growth are positively associated. More recent research has shed more light on this
issue by looking at thresholds (or third factors) such as a sound institutional framework and
macroeconomic stability; however, to-date these results remained mixed at best (Arteta
et al., 2001; Edison et al., 2002; Klein, 2005).3
The theoretical literature that focuses on FDI identies a number of channels through
which FDI inows will be benecial to the target economy; yet, the empirical literature
has lagged behind and has had more trouble identifying these advantages in practice. The
consensus that is slowly emerging is that FDI is benecial when compared to other types
of capital inows such as portfolio investment or syndicated bank loans, though there are
economists who maintain that even this benecial e¤ect is limited. Nonetheless, additional
research e¤orts have also been devoted to identifying other features unique to FDI such as
its relative permanence and the positive externalities it generates (see Aitken and Harrison
(1999) for a micro-level study, and Fernadez-Arias and Montiel (1996); Sarno and Taylor
(1999) for macro-level studies).
One reason why empirical research on the nancial openness-growth nexus is still in-
conclusive relates to the fact that di¤erent econometric techniques make it di¢ cult to
harmonize the results; and although the bulk of research papers take cross-country growth
models as the starting point, visible dissimilarities remain vis-à-vis the sample of countries,
the sampling period, and the estimation techniques employed. For example, contempo-
raneous research has typically employed a neoclassical growth model where economists
regress the growth rate of real GDP per capita on a proxy for nancial openness, in addi-
tion to a set of control variables which stand-in for fundamental growth drivers.4 However,
the econometric models employed di¤er in three important respects: (1) with regard to the
measures for the degree of nancial openness; (2) with regard to the model specication;
and (3) with regard to the use of the investment rate versus the capital stock per worker.
Financial openness has at times been measured by the extent to which legal (de jure)
hurdles impede the free ow of capital (Quinn, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Chinn and Ito, 2005);
3Eichengreen (2002), Edison et al. (2002), Kose et al (2006), Henry (2007), and Obstfeld (2009) have
given comprehensive assessments of the literature linking nancial openness and growth.
4Such as the investment to GDP ratio, human capital, plus a convergence e¤ect.
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however, it has also been argued that nancial openness should be measured quantitatively
(de facto) by using, for example, the sum of nancial assets and liabilities as a proportion
of GDP (see Kose et al., 2006). Eichengreen (2001) and Edison et al. (2002) compare and
contrast both approaches, and conclude that the choice of indicator is both a question of
convenience and accessibility to data. The second main issue in which current research
di¤ers relates to the econometric model. Some authors have argued that short-term policy
variables like the budget decit and ination need to be included (Edison et al., 2002),
while other researchers have chosen to mimic Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), by employing
a more selective set of the determinants of long-run economic growth. In particular, the
addition of the investment rate as a percentage of GDP has proved challenging; for example,
Edison et al. (2002), Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), Klein and Olivei (1999), and Bekaert
et al. (2006) did not include it under the argument of endogeneity, although the motivation
has not always been discussed in detail by most economists. Nevertheless, other economists
such as Rodrik (1998), Arteta et al. (2001), Edwards (2001), and Klein (2003) control
for di¤erent investment rates measured at the start of the sampling period; however, as
Bosworth and Collins (2003) indicate, using the investment rate severely biases any results.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned caveats, the results herein show that de facto
nancial openness (as proxied by di¤erent types of capital ows) stimulate economic growth
for developing and emerging markets. In particular, I nd that FDI positively a¤ects GDP
per worker growth, and that FDI also a¤ects the growth rate of the capital stock per worker
positively with (non-robust) evidence of crowding-in e¤ects; this mirrors the Borensztein
et al. (1998) results. As far as developed economies, I nd that higher levels of both FDI
and portfolio-type inows improve GDP per worker growth, but that only the latter type
of capital stimulates capital accumulation with crowding-in e¤ects. The one similarity
between developed and developing economies is that FDI positively a¤ects total factor
productivity in both cases.
The road map for the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the economet-
ric methodology. Section 3 explores the stylized facts of the relationship between nancial
openness and the components of economic growth. Section 4 formally looks at the rela-
tionship between de facto measures of nancial openness as proxied by FDI and portfolio
inows, to gauge the e¤ects of nancial openness on GDP per worker growth and on the
growth rate of the capital stock for both developed and developing economies. Section 5
discusses absorptive capacity and "relative backwardness" issues, while section 6 looks at
the e¤ects of de facto nancial openness on total factor productivity (TFP). Last but not
least, section 7 summarizes and concludes.
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2 Data & Econometric Methodology
Situations in which past decisions impact on current behavior are ubiquitous in economics.
In this light, panel data sets provide a solution to accommodating the joint occurrence of
dynamics and "unobserved" heterogeneity in the task at hand. Therefore, in order to test
the hypothesis that nancial openness and di¤erent types of capital ows have a positive
e¤ect on economic growth, I employ a dynamic panel-data methodology; thereby making
it possible to control for country-specic e¤ects, the potential endogeneity of the explana-
tory variables, in addition to autocorrelation and persistence. Nickell (1981) was the rst
to show that the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is not consistent for a
nite number of time periods in panel data models; however, ever since his seminal work,
a number of consistent IV and GMM estimators have been proposed as an alternative to
LSDV. For example, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest two simple IV estimators that use
the second lags of the dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged and di¤erenced
dependent variable. Additionally, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a GMM estimator
for a model in rst di¤erences, which is more e¢ cient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
estimator. As a follow-up, Blundell and Bond (1998) detect that rst-di¤erenced IV or
GMM estimators may well experience a small sample bias due to frail instruments, es-
pecially when the data is exceedingly persistent. As a solution they suggest a system
GMM estimator with rst-di¤erenced instruments for the levels-equation and instruments
in levels for the equation in rst-di¤erences
However, a weakness of both the IV and GMM estimators is that their properties hold
for a large number of observations, which implies that they can be severely biased and
imprecise in macro panel models. On the other hand, Monte Carlo studies by Arellano
and Bond (1991), Kiviet (1995), and Judson and Owen (1999) show that IV and GMM
estimators have a higher variance when compared to LSDV, although the latter estimator
is still inconsistent. An alternative approach, based on a bias-correction of LSDV, has
recently regained popularity in the literature. Nickell (1981) derives an expression for
the inconsistency in LSDV, while Kiviet (1995) uses "more complicated" techniques to
derive the small sample bias of the LSDV estimator. However, the approximation terms
evaluated at the unobserved true parameter values are of no direct use for estimation;
therefore, to make them operational Kiviet (1995) and Kiviet (1999) suggest replacing
the true parameters by the estimates from some consistent estimators. His Monte Carlo
evidence shows that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) tends to outperform
the IV-GMM estimators, especially in terms of bias and root mean squared error (Bruno,
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2005). In addition, Judson and Owen (1999) give strong support to LSDVC, especially
when the number of observations is small. Bun and Kiviet (2003) simplify Kiviet (1999);
furthermore, they perform Monte Carlo experiments that show that 90% of the actual
bias can be accounted for when they evaluate their rst-order approximation term at
its true parameter value. However, none of the aforementioned corrections to the LSDV
estimator is possible for unbalanced panels; however, this hole in the econometric literature
is lled by Bruno (2005). Therefore, I will employ the bias corrected LSDV estimator for
unbalanced panels as developed by Bruno (2005), where the correction employed is based
on the "system GMM" estimator as developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).
2.1 Construction of Accounts
As we know from the literature, growth accounts bode well with alternative formulations
of the relationship between factors of production and output. All that is required is a
su¢ cient level of competition to ensure that the returns to the factors of production are
proportionate to their productivity (Bosworth and Collins, 2003). However, as Bosworth
and Collins (2003) explain, consistent measures of factor income shares are seldom available
for individual economies; thereby forcing economists to use xed income-share weights. For
the construction of the accounts, I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
Y = AK(LH)1  (1)
The capital share, , is assumed equal to one-third for the entire sample.5 H is a
measure of educational attainment stemming from the Barro-Lee dataset.6 I report the
results through a decomposition of the growth in output per worker (y
l
), by looking into
the contributions of growth in capital per worker (k
l
) , increases in education per worker
(h), and the contribution of improvements in TFP (a):
y
l
= (
k
l
) + (1  )h+ a (2)
I assume (as in the literature) that capital services grow proportionally to the capital stock,
which I estimate through the perpetual inventory model,
5Gollin (2002) concludes that once self-employment income is account for, capital income shares are
stable over time within countries, and similar across countries (see also Bernanke and Gurkaynak, 2001;
and Caselli and Feyrer, 2007 for a discussion on the marginal product of capital).
6The actual variable used is the secondary school completion rate as a percentage of the labor force
over 25 years of age.
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Kt = Kt 1(1  d) + It (3)
where the depreciation rate, d, equals 0:10. The basic gross xed capital formation data
extending back to 1960 (in constant $2000) and the measure of labor input both come
from the World Bank.
2.1.1 Investment Rate versus the Capital Stock
As noted by Bosworth and Collins (2003), the choice between the investment rate and
the growth rate of the capital stock has extremely important implications for empirical
analysis. The change in the capital stock is given by
K = I   dK (4)
dividing both sides by K and assuming a steady-state value () for the inverse of the
capital-output ratio allows the rate of change of the capital stock (k) to be measured by
the investment rate:
k = 

I
Y

  d (5)
A production function such as (2) can be re-written to replace k with the steady-state
approximation (5), yielding the formulation used in many cross-national studies,
y
l
= (

I
Y

  d) + (1  )(h+ l) + a (6)
As Bosworth and Collins (2003) state:
"The use of the investment rate has an obvious advantage. It avoids the
measurement problems introduced by the choice of an initial capital stock and
an assumed rate of depreciation. However, the assumption of a constant capital-
output ratio seems particularly unreasonable for studying the growth experi-
ences of a highly diverse groups of countries, many of which seem very far from
conditions of steady-state. It also seems unreasonable to assume the same
capital-output ratio across a sample of countries at very di¤erent stages of
development."
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When it comes to the denition of nancial openness, it has long been recognized that
it is complicated to measure its extent (see Eichengreen, 2001; Edison et al., 2004); and
although there have been many attempts at describing the extent and intensity of capital
controls, the consensus is that any such measures fail to fully capture the complexity of real-
world capital controls for a number of reasons. First, conventional measures of quantifying
capital controls (or nancial openness) fail to account for the intensity of capital controls,
where the most prominent example of such measures include dummy variables stemming
from the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER). Second, as Chinn-Ito (2007) state, "IMF-based variables are too aggregated
to illustrate the complexity of actual capital controls". Thirdly, it is extremely di¢ cult to
discriminate between de jure and de facto capital controls. In other words, capital control
policies are regularly implemented without explicit policy goals to control the volume
and/or type of capital ows. On the other hand, the private sector often circumvents
capital account restrictions, thereby eliminating any e¤ect of the capital controls (Edwards,
1999).
This simple discussion suggests that a distinction between de jure and de facto nancial
openness is crucial to any analysis. After all, what matters for analyzing the relationship
between nancial openness and economic growth is not how integrated economies are
"on paper", but how integrated they are in practice. Accordingly, I will proxy de facto
nancial openness through the amount of FDI and Portfolio inows (this data stems from
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF). Other research has had the tendency
to use net capital inows or the current account balance as proxies for de facto nancial
openness (see Prasad et al., 2007; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2009). However, this assumes
that all capital is created equal and that they will all have similar e¤ects on an economy.
Needless to say, this is an extreme assumption, since it is well known that long-term capital
inows like FDI are more stable and more persistent (see Sarno and Taylor, 1999), while
short-term capital inows are more prone to sudden stops and quick reversals. It is this
latter type of capital that can be more destabilizing to an economy by increasing downside
risk (see Garita and Zhou, 2009).
I also consider several additional control variables, including trade openness, the U.S
real interest rate as a driver of capital ows (dened as the US T-bill rate minus CPI ina-
tion - both from IFS), the black market premium as an index of macroeconomic distortions,
an index of political rights from the Freedom House that ranges from 1 (the highest de-
gree of freedom) to 7 (the lowest degree of freedom). Moreover, in order to estimate the
relationship between nancial openness, the di¤erent types of capital ows, and economic
9
growth, ve-year periods are employed, which is typical in the literature, since ve years
is thought to be long enough to eliminate business-cycle e¤ects, but short enough to cap-
ture important changes that occur over time for a particular economy (see Henry, 2007).
Moreover, I decompose the sample into 25 developed economies and 186 developing and
emerging economies (see Appendix A).
3 Stylized Facts
Before turning to the regression analysis, I begin by looking into the stylized facts of the
relationship between de facto nancial openness and economic growth for the entire sample
(1970   2005). Moreover, I also consider how this relationship might have changed over
time by decomposing the full sample into two sub-periods: 1970  1985 and 1985  2005.
By now it is well recognized in the economics profession that a structural break occurred in
the mid-1980s in many respects; but specially in terms of nancial openness, since many
economies around the world began to undertake capital account liberalization programs
around this period. As far as the descriptive part of this section, the sample is further
decomposed into those economies with a below(above)-average level of de facto openness
as proxied by the amount of FDI inows.
Figures 1 and 2 display the cross-sectional mean of labor productivity and the average
contributions of the three components separately for the less and more nancially open de-
veloping economies (in terms of FDI inows) for the periods before and after 1985. As far
as less nancially open developing economies, the contribution of TFP remained relatively
similar during both periods, while output growth was mostly inuenced by the accumu-
lation of physical capital. Turning to the more nancially open developing economies we
see that, in the period after 1985, these economies have enjoyed an almost doubling in
the contribution of TFP to economic growth, surpassing the contribution of capital ac-
cumulation. Figures 3 and 4 perform the same exercise for developed economies. These
gures show that there was virtually no change in the contribution of any of the three
components for the less nancially open developed economies in terms of FDI. However,
for the more nancially open developed economies, we can notice a dramatic increase in
TFP after 1985. The main conclusion of this crude disaggregation of the sample, is that on
average more nancially open developed and developing economies, in terms of allowing
more FDI inows, have enjoyed faster productivity growth over the "most recent" period
of globalization, and this suggests that there is a positive relationship between de facto
nancial openness and economic growth, especially TFP growth.
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Figure 1: Growth Accounting for Less de facto Financially Open Developing Economies
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Figure 2: Growth Accounting for More de facto Financially Open Developing Economies
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Figure 3: Growth Accounting for Less de facto Financially Open Developed Economies
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Figure 4: Growth Accounting for More de facto Financially Open Developed Economies
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4 De Facto Financial Openness7
The research avenue of analysis into the outcome of nancial openness vis-à-vis economic
growth, which I pursue in this section, is based on the view that capital ows are not
all created equal. For example, Stiglitz (2000) has argued that economies (especially
developing economies) should pursue long-term capital ows, while "regulating" short-
term inows. That is, capital ows that are characterized by "equity-like" features are
not only believed to be more stable and less prone to reversals (see Wei, 2006), but are
also believed to carry with them many indirect benets of nancial globalization, such
as transfers of managerial and technological expertise, but also the reduction of nancing
constraints (see Blalock and Gertler, 2005).
While we must realize that it is di¢ cult to state unequivocally that private capital ows
drive growth (since it could be that domestic growth drives capital ows), the evidence
does seem to point to the idea that private capital ows can, at the very least, reinforce
the growth process. Although economic theory and empirical investigations have much to
say about where international capital ows may gravitate, both theory and evidence are
less precise about the impact of such ows on a "local" economy. For example, once in
a country, private capital ows may increase domestic consumption, investment, and/or
TFP, or they may principally increase a countrys foreign exchange reserves. However, if
ows are driven merely by incentives to evade taxes or jump other legal barriers, money
may ow out of a country as quickly as it ows in.
The results in Table 1 show that the "standard" growth drivers have the expected
e¤ect (time dummies will always be included in all regressions in order to isolate purely
cross-country e¤ects; however, these results will not be reported). Moreover, Table 1
conrms that FDI inows are indeed benecial to the growth prospects of developing
and emerging markets.8 Most of the burgeoning literature analyzing portfolio ows into
emerging markets suggests that portfolio equity ows should have a positive and signicant
impact on economic growth; however, the results in specication 1:2 do not conrm this
positive association. Specication 1:3 introduces the (ln)black market premium, where the
7I also tried all the regressions in sections 4 and 6 with what Kose et al. (2006) call "nancial integra-
tion", which is simply the sum of nancial assets and liabilities divided by GDP stemming from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). However, this variable never entered signicantly.
8I also performed two additional regressions; one on what I call the BRICplus economies only; which
are: Brazil, Russia, India, China, Hong-Kong, Israel, Mexico, Singapore, and South Korea. The results
for this regression still indicate that FDI inows contribute positively and signicantly to GDP per worker
growth. The other regression was performed on all other developing economies (excluding the BRICplus
economies), and the results continue to show the aforementioned positive relationship.
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results conrm the expected negative e¤ect of the black market premium on the growth
rate of an economy.9 Figure 5, which is based on specication 1:4 shows that FDI inows
do stimulate growth in GDP per worker, but only when the initial level of human capital
is below 35% (section 5 will elaborate further on this issue).10
Table 1: De Facto Financial Openness and Growth in GDPpw for Developing Economies
Dependent variable: lnGDPw
1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4
lnGDPwt 1 0.101 0.093 0.019 0.057
(0.071) (0.059) (0.065) (0.058)
Initial GDPpc -2.436  -2.374  -3.019  -1.807 
(0.756) (1.061) (1.494) (1.009)
Human Capital 0.109  0.093  0.154  0.167 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.069) (0.061)
(G/Y) -0.024 -0.024 -0.048 -0.021
(0.044) (0.037) (0.078) (0.036)
FDI Inows 0.341  0.325  0.434  0.813 
(0.099) (0.098) (0.132) (0.229)
Portfolio Inows -0.065 0.159 0.052
(0.125) (0.243) (0.132)
LnBMP -0.405 
(0.213)
FDI Inows*HC -0.021 
(0.008)
observations 286 281 216 281
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels respectively
9While note reported here, I also interacted the LnBMP with FDI inows, but this interaction was not
signicant. Moreover, the Political Rights index from the Freedom House was never signicant.
10The total e¤ect is calculated as 1 + 2HC, where 1 denotes the coe¢ cient of FDI and 2 the
interaction coe¢ cient. For the moment dHC = dFDI = 0.
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Figure 5: E¤ect of FDI inows on lnGDPw for Developing Economies (with 95% C.I)
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As far as developed economies, Table 2 shows that both FDI and portfolio invest-
ment have a positive and signicant e¤ect on economic growth. These results are in line
with Reisen and Soto (2001) and Durham (2004) who nd that both capital ows can
have growth-promoting e¤ects. As far as the total e¤ect of FDI inows, Figure 6 (based
on specication 2:3) shows that FDI inows have a positive e¤ect on economic growth;
however, this e¤ect is not signicantly positive for economies with a human capital level
exceeding 55% (i.e. Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and
the US).
The results for portfolio inows can best be discerned by looking at Figure 7, which is
based on specication 2:4. The gure indicates that economies with a human capital level
below 43%, are the ones that benet the most from portfolio inows vis-à-vis the growth
rate of GDP per worker. For example, the marginal e¤ect is signicantly positive for
Greece (1970-1990), Portugal (1970-2005) and Spain (1970-1990); moreover, even though
the United States has a human capital level of almost 46% (in the period 2001-2005), I
cannot reject the possibility that there is no e¤ect (or even a negative e¤ect) of portfolio
ows on the growth rate of GDP per worker. Another notable result in Table 2, is the
negative e¤ect of government spending on GDP per worker growth, which simply points
in the direction of scal discipline as a growth driver.
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Figure 6: E¤ect of FDI inows on lnGDPw for Developed Economies (with 95% C.I)
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Figure 7: E¤ect of Port. inows on lnGDPw for Developed Economies (with 95% C.I)
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Table 2: De Facto Financial Openness and Growth in GDPpw for Developed Economies
Dependent variable: lnGDPw
2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4
lnGDPwt 1 -0.079 -0.089 -0.068 -0.078
(0.089) (0.093) (0.091) (0.092)
Initial GDPpc -1.707 -1.746  -2.207  -2.132 
(1.070) (1.048) (1.090) (1.068)
Human Capital 0.015 0.013 0.054  0.024
(0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021)
(G/Y) -0.266  -0.281  -0.326  -0.347 
(0.092) (0.083) (0.087) (0.087)
FDI Inows 0.185  0.957 
(0.068) (0.336)
Portfolio Inows 0.038  0.363 
(0.019) (0.130)
FDI Inows*HC -0.017 
(0.007)
Portfolio_Inows*HC -0.007 
(0.002)
observations 126 127 126 126
Notes:bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels respectively
4.1 Capital Inows and the Capital Stock
The following section measures the e¤ect of de facto nancial openness on the growth rate of
the capital stock per worker. In particular, I distinguish between FDI inows and portfolio
inows, where theory predicts that these type of capital ows can simulate economic growth
by augmenting capital accumulation and/or by improving total factor productivity (this
section focuses on the rst channel; see section 6 for the TFP channel). The growth impact
of FDI ows has attracted renewed interest in the wake of the "recent" nancial crisis,
where developed and developing economies alike are looking for "new" engines of growth.
However, while the theoretical literature has pointed out that FDI may boost growth,
the empirical literature shows considerable disagreement vis-à-vis the relevance of these
impacts. On the one hand, rm-level data often nd no signicant productivity e¤ects of
FDI (see for example Fernadez-Arias and Montiel, 1996). On the other hand, macro-level
studies tend to conclude that FDI boosts growth via higher productivity and/or physical
investment (see World Bank, 2001), while other papers argue that this requires the target
economy to satisfy certain thresholds (see Borensztein et al., 1998). More recent studies
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are even less successful in establishing a connection between FDI and economic growth (see
Blonigen and Wang, 2004; Carkovic and Levine, 2005). Despite these ambiguities, private
capital ows (with equity-like features) are generally found to have a signicant impact on
domestic investment, with the relationship being strongest for FDI and international bank
lending, and weaker for portfolio ows (Bosworth and Collins, 1999).
Table 3: De Facto Financial Openness and Capital Stock per worker for Developing
Economies
Dependent variable: LnKstockw
3:1 3:2 3:3 3:4 3:5
LnKstockw;t 1 0.542  0.542  0.503  0.482  0.486 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.111) (0.098) (0.098)
LnGDPpcini 0.023 0.023 0.302 0.190 0.239
(1.145) (1.145) (1.260) (1.418) (1.457)
Human Capital -0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.025 0.039
(0.059) (0.059) (0.082) (0.074) (0.088)
lnBMP -0.497  -0.497  -0.676  -0.519  -0.502 
(0.246) (0.246) (0.283) (0.219) (0.226)
FDI Inows 0.532  0.532  0.701  0.741  0.832 
(0.157) (0.157) (0.230) (0.199) (0.352)
US Real Int. Rate -0.387  -0.411  -0.465  -0.471 
(0.131) (0.112) (0.141) (0.141)
Portfolio Inows -0.051 -0.105 -0.109
(0.210) (0.282) (0.294)
G/Y 0.189  0.198 
(0.103) (0.101)
Political Rights -0.093 -0.094
(0.271) (0.270)
FDI Inows * HC -0.005
(0.022)
observations 206 206 165 164 164
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
, ,  are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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Table 3 shows that, for developing economies, an increase in FDI inows of 10% leads
to an increase in the growth rate of the capital stock per worker of 5:3% (in specication
3:1) to 8:3% (in specication 3:5). However, while these results show a positive correlation
and crowding-in e¤ects11 (for specications 3:1 and 3:2) between FDI inows and capital
accumulation, they also indicate that FDI might be crowding out domestic investment
in developing economies (see specications 3:3   3:5). Moreover, portfolio inows do not
have a signicant e¤ect on capital accumulation (3:3). Adding the share of government
expenditures (G=Y ) and an index of political rights does not change the estimates in
(3:4). The last column (specication 3:5) introduces an interaction between FDI inows
and human capital; however, the interaction term is not signicant, while the total e¤ect
of FDI inows on the growth rate of the capital stock increases to 0:83.12 I also use
the (ln)black market premium as an indicator of economic instability, since it can be
interpreted as both a measure of expectations of depreciation of the localcurrency, and
as a rudimentary index of distortions; therefore, it should be negatively correlated with
the growth rate of the capital stock. As expected, the growth rate in the capital stock per
worker falls with this premium. The usage of the real interest rate in the USA follows Calvo
et al. (1996) who argue that the U.S. interest rate is a strong determinant of capital ows,
especially to developing economies. More recently, Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) have
argued that domestic investment should be quite sensitive to the availability of resource
inows; however, only when an economy is "saving-constrained" (I must mention that from
the results we cannot say anything as to whether an economy is "saving-constrained" or
"investment-constrained"). The results in Table 3 also shows that tighter monetary policy
in the U.S. leads to a lower growth rate of the capital stock per worker for developing
economies.
As far as developed economies, the results in Table 4 are markedly di¤erent in compari-
son to developing economies. However, one major di¤erence in the regression specications
is that the black market premium is not used since it is almost non-existent for developed
economies; therefore, I use the political rights index from the Freedom House as a basic
control variable. In all specications the political rights index enters with a negative sign
as expected (remember that this index ranges from 1 = Highest degree of freedom to
7 = lowest degree of freedom), indicating that more political freedoms are associated with
11H0 :  > 1; H1 :   1; t = ( 1)s ; t <  1:645 ! H0 is not rejected. These results corroborate
Borensztein et al. (1998) who also found a (non-robust) crowding-in e¤ect for developing economies.
12Following footnote 8, the results of this decomposition show that for BRICplus economies, FDI inows
have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the growth rate of the capital stock. For all other economies, FDI
inows continue to stimulate positively the growth rate of the capital stock, with crowding-in e¤ects.
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higher growth rates of the capital stock per worker. Moreover, the G=Y -ratio has a nega-
tive e¤ect on capital accumulation showing that scal discipline is benecial for the growth
rate of the capital stock per worker. Interestingly, FDI inows do not have a signicant
e¤ect on capital accumulation. However, portfolio inows are positively and signicantly
correlated with the growth rate of the capital stock, also indicating that portfolio inows
to developed economies have a crowding-in e¤ect for domestic investment.
Table 4: De Facto Financial Openness and the Capital Stock per worker for Developed
Economies
Dependent variable: LnKstockw
4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4
LnKstockw;t 1 0.567  0.597  0.594  0.595 
(0.066) (0.110) (0.112) (0.112)
LnGDPpcini 0.539 0.026 -0.040 -0.193
(0.753) (0.890) (0.906) (0.920)
Human Capital 0.013 0.019 0.032 0.024
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018)
G/Y -0.161  -0.174  -0.197  -0.190 
(0.080) (0.086) (0.085) (0.081)
US Real Int. Rate -0.037 -0.020 -0.026 -0.016
(0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
FDI Inows -0.014 -0.006 0.261 0.007
(0.079) (0.082) (0.003) (0.083)
Portfolio Inows 0.101  0.100  0.096  0.236 
(0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.112)
Political Rights -0.329  -0.301  -0.305 
(0.167) (0.172) (0.173)
FDI*HC -0.005
(0.006)
Portfolio*HC -0.003
(0.003)
observations 120 111 111 111
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
, ,  are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
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5 Absorptive Capacity & "Relative Backwardness"
International economists have long argued that along with international trade, the most
important medium for international technology transfer is FDI. Furthermore, it is well
known that multinational corporations (MNCs) are responsible for the bulk of the worlds
private R&D e¤orts, and in turn produce, own, and control the lions share of the worlds
advanced technology. As argued by Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), when MNCs set up a
foreign a¢ liate, the a¢ liate receives some of the "technology" that comprises the parents
rm-specic advantage and therefore allows the a¢ liate "to compete successfully with local
rms that (might) have better-quality knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences,
and business practices". This argument indicates that there might be a geographical
di¤usion of technology, but not necessarily a formal transfer of knowledge beyond the
boundary of the MNC, since the establishment of a foreign a¢ liate is basically a decision
to internalize the use of "core technology". However, MNC technology can still pour out
to the surrounding economy, which improves human capital in the host economy, and can
lead to productivity increases in domestic rms.
In many cases, forward and/or backward linkages play a major role, since MNCs pro-
vide training and technical assistance to their business networks, including workers and
managers. In this manner, longer-term capital ows with equity-like features, like FDI, can
be a particularly valuable source of "new technology" since as argued in the introduction,
this type of capital ow not only introduce new ideas, but also strengthens the human
capital base needed to adapt these ideas to the local market. However, as emphasized
by Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), productivity and technology spillovers are not certain
outcomes of FDI. Instead, they argue that FDI and human capital interact in a complex
manner, where FDI inows have the capability to create knowledge spillovers on the local
workforce. At the same time, the host economieslevel of "human capital determines how
much FDI it can attract and whether local rms are able to absorb the potential benets.
Therefore, it is likely that the relationship is non-linear and that multiple equilibria are
possible" (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). For example, economies with "high" levels of
human capital can attract large levels of "technology intensive" FDI, which contributes to
the further development of local labor skills. At the same time, economies with weaker
levels of human capital can experience relatively smaller inows of FDI; however, those
foreign rms that do decide to enter the market are likely to be "simple technology" users
that none-the-less can have a major impact local learning and skill development.
Kose et al. (2006) stress that nancial openness only leads to "better outcomes" when
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certain initial conditions are met. In contrast, the estimation results herein (as illustrated
in Figures 5-7) point to negative interaction e¤ects with human capital, implying that
countries that operate before a certain human capital threshold seem to benet the most
from de facto nancial globalization. This "relative backwardness" between economies
was rst emphasized by Findlay (1978), who highlighted its importance for the speed of
adoption of new technologies and spillover benets from MNCs. Findlays model suggests
that the greater the technological distance between the less advanced host country and
the advanced home country, the greater the available opportunities to exploit in the host
country and therefore, the more rapidly new technologies are adopted. In other words, the
potential for positive spillovers is higher the larger the absorptive capacity gap between
host and home countries, which is precisely the results found in this paper. In the next
section, I probe deeper into this e¤ect by looking at how di¤erent types of de facto nancial
openness a¤ect total factor productivity (TFP).
6 Financial Openness and TFP
The approach that I follow in this last section ties in well with the literature identied
by Kose et al. (2006), who emphasize the importance of TFP growth as the main driver
of long-term growth. However, at the end of the day, if de facto nancial openness is
to have permanent e¤ects on growth, it must push up the production possibility frontier.
The literature has argued that "total" foreign direct investment may bring new technology
and management techniques that increase the e¢ ciency of "acquired" rms and generate
economy-wide spillovers. For example, Mishkin (2006) has argued that developing coun-
tries can import greater e¢ ciency by allowing foreign investors to take controlling stakes
in domestic nancial rms, and thereby bring in state-of-the-art nancial intermediation
practices. Recently, Henry (2007) has even stated that "these stories are plausible but
empirically unsubstantiated". Surprisingly, research on whether nancial openness raises
TFP is scarce. Recent exceptions are Edwards (2001) who concludes that the evidence
is not robust; and Bonglioli (2007), who shows that nancial integration has a positive
direct e¤ect on productivity, albeit with the use of a dummy variable to proxy for nancial
integration. In addition, the empirical literature on the spillover e¤ects of FDI also gives
mixed results. For example, some studies argue that foreign ownership has a positive e¤ect
on productivity for domestic rms and industries (see Barrell and Pain, 1997); while other
studies nd little or no evidence of spillover e¤ects stemming from FDI (see Aitken and
Harrison, 1999).
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The results of the TFP-regressions for both developing and developed economies in
Table 5 tend to support Mishkins story. First, FDI inows do contribute to TFP growth
for both types of economies (see specication 5:1 and 6:1). Second, portfolio inows do
not have a signicant e¤ect for developing economies (specication 5:2), while portfolio
inows do have a positive e¤ect on TFP growth for developed economies (see specication
6:2).13 Third, threshold e¤ects in terms of human capital do not improve the explanation
of TFP growth.14
Table 5: De facto Financial Openness and TFP for Developing and Developed Economies
Dependent variable: TFP growth
Developing & Emerging Markets Developed Economies
5:1 5:2 5:3 6:1 6:2 6:3
TFP growtht 1 0.152  0.132  0.130 -0.157  -0.170  -0.142
(0.085) (0.074) (0.085) (0.083) (0.095) (0.088)
Initial GDPpc -2.481  -2.337  -2.222  -2.110  -2.108  -2.709 
(0.895) (0.881) (0.919) (0.994) (0.970) (1.022)
Human Capital 0.078 0.068 0.108  0.025 0.022 0.055 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
US Real Int. Rate -0.235  -0.229  -0.248  -0.122  -0.136  -0.123 
(0.112) (0.121) (0.111) (0.054) (0.064) (0.056)
(G/Y) -0.056 -0.052 -0.041 -0.284  -0.300  -0.350 
(0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.086) (0.076) (0.087)
FDI Inows 0.212  0.236  0.423  0.173  0.647 
(0.111) (0.134) (0.214) (0.063) (0.362)
Portfolio Inows -0.098 0.035  0.177
(0.116) (0.018) (0.160)
FDI*HC -0.009 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Portfolio*HC -0.004
(0.003)
observations 209 204 209 126 127 126
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis;
*, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% signicant levels respectively
13In Table 5 I only report the individual e¤ect of portfolio inows for developed economies. When I
include both FDI and portfolio inows, then both coe¢ cients become non-signicant.
14For the BRICplus economies, FDI inows continue to have positive e¤ects on TFP growth (but only
at the 10% signicance). For all other economies the results are the same, and positively signicant at
standard levels.
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7 Conclusions
In order to understand the total e¤ect of nancial openness on economic growth, it is
important to know the channels and the directionality through which such policies a¤ect
an economy. Furthermore, it is important to take into account the possibility that nancial
openness a¤ects countries di¤erently (this is especially true for developed versus developing
economies). In this light, this paper has probed deeper into the aforementioned relationship
by studying separately the impact of de facto nancial openness on economic growth
and its components. By studying the direct and indirect channels of de facto nancial
openness, I nd that FDI inows positively a¤ect GDP per worker growth and that these
inows also a¤ect capital accumulation positively with (non-robust) evidence of crowding-
in e¤ects, mirroring the Borensztein et al. (1998) results. When it comes to developed
economies, the results show that FDI and portfolio inows both play a signicant and
positive role in stimulating the growth rate of GDP per worker. As far as the growth
rate of the capital stock per worker, the results for advanced economies show that only
portfolio inows matter for capital accumulation with crowding-in e¤ects on domestic
investment. The one similarity between developed and developing economies relates to
the TFP regression results, which show that there is a signicant and positive correlation
between FDI inows and TFP for both types of economies. The paper also nds evidence
in favor of the importance of "relative backwardness" for the speed of adoption of new
technologies and spillover benets. This suggests that the greater the technological distance
between the "less advanced" host economy and the "advanced" home country, the greater
the available opportunities to exploit in the host country, and therefore, the more rapidly
"new technologies" are adopted. From a policy perspective, while the literature suggests
that transitional risks are associated with nancial openness, this paper shows that resisting
de facto nancial openness (especially in terms of FDI inows) over an extended period may
prove counterproductive. One possible strategy is to try to mitigate the down-side risks
associated with an open capital account (see Garita and Zhou, 2009). In this light, sound
domestic policies and institutions, a regulatory framework promoting a strong and e¢ cient
nancial sector, and e¤ective systems and procedures for monitoring capital ows greatly
improve the chances of ensuring that capital inows foster sustainable growth. Therefore,
counter-intuitive as it may seem (especially given the severe economic downturn that is
gripping the world economy), more and not less nancial openness is the way forward;
however, only if it is initially done by attracting long-term investment ows, while keeping
a close watch on short-term capital ows.
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Appendix A - List of Countries
Developed Economies
AUSTRALIA FINLAND IRELAND MONACO SPAIN
AUSTRIA FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS SWEDEN
BELGIUM GERMANY JAPAN NEW ZEALAND SW ITZERLAND
CANADA GREECE LIECHTENSTEIN NORWAY UK
DENMARK ICELAND LUXEMBOURG PORTUGAL USA
Developing (Emerging) Economies
AFGHANISTAN BELIZE CENTRAL A. REP. DOMINICAN REP. GUATEMALA
ALBANIA BENIN CHAD ECUADOR GUINEA
ALGERIA BERMUDA CHILE EGYPT GUINEA BISSAU
ANDORRA BHUTAN CHINA EL SALVADOR GUYANA
ANGOLA BOLIVIA COLOMBIA EQUATORIAL GUINEA GREENLAND
ANTIGUA AND BAR. BOSNIA -HERZ. COMOROS ERITREA HAITI
ARGENTINA BOTSWANA CONGO ESTONIA HONDURAS
ARMENIA BRAZIL COSTA RICA ETHIOPIA HONG KONG
AZERBAIJAN BRUNEI COTE DIVOIRE FIJI HUNGARY
AMERICAN SAMOA BULGARIA CROATIA FAEROE ISLANDS INDIA
ARUBA BURKINA FASO CUBA GABON INDONESIA
BAHAMAS BURUNDI CYPRUS GAMBIA IRAN
BAHRAIN CAMBODIA CZECH REP. GEORGIA IRAQ
BANGLADESH CAMEROON CHANNEL ISL. GHANA ISRAEL
BARBADOS CAPE VERDE CONGO D. R . (ZAIRE) GRENADA ISLE OF MAN
BELARUS CAYMAN ISLANDS DJIBOUTI GUAM JAMAICA
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Developing (Emerging) Economies (continued)
JORDAN MALTA OMAN SLOVAK REPUBLIC TUNISIA
KAZAKHSTAN MARSHALL ISL . PAKISTAN SLOVENIA TURKEY
KENYA MARTINIQUE PALAU SOLOMON ISLANDS TURKMENISTAN
KIRIBATI MAURITANIA PANAMA SOMALIA TUVALU
KOREA NORTH MAURITIUS PAPUA N. G . SOUTH AFRICA UGANDA
KOREA SOUTH MEXICO PARAGUAY SRI LANKA UKRAINE
KUWAIT M ICRONESIA PERU ST KITTS AND NEVIS UNITED ARAB E.
KYRGYZ REP. MOLDOVA PHILIPPINES ST LUCIA URUGUAY
LAOS MONGOLIA POLAND ST VINCENT AND THE G . UZBEKISTAN
LATVIA MOROCCO PUERTO RICO SUDAN VANUATU
LEBANON MOZAMBIQUE QATAR SURINAME VENEZUELA
LESOTHO MYANMAR ROMANIA SWAZILAND VIETNAM
LIBERIA MAYOTTE RUSSIA SYRIA VIRGIN ISLANDS(US)
LIBYA NAMIBIA RWANDA SERBIA AND MONT. WEST BANK
LITHUANIA NAURU SAMOA TAIWAN YEMEN
MACAO NEPAL SAN MARINO TAJIK ISTAN YUGOSLAVIA
MACEDONIA NETHERLANDS A. SAO TOME AND P. TANZANIA ZAMBIA
MADAGASCAR NICARAGUA SAUDI ARABIA THAILAND ZIMBABWE
MALAW I NIGER SENEGAL TIMOR EAST
MALAYSIA NIGERIA SEYCHELLES TOGO
MALDIVES NEW CALEDONIA SIERRA LEONE TONGA
MALI N . MARIANA ISL. SINGAPORE TRINIDAD AND T.
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Appendix B - Descriptive Statistics
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for 186 Developing Economies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
growth GDPw 0.94 4.72 -36.97 37.17 932
growth Kstockw 2.11 5.53 -10.72 53.42 593
TFP 0.47 3.56 -17.34 15.93 521
Initial GDPpc 8.16 1.09 5.23 11.11 975
Human Capital 15.91 12.15 0.30 63.90 580
G/Y 23.59 11.05 2.48 89.22 1026
Financial Openness -0.23 1.38 -1.77 2.60 888
Trade Openness 81.31 50.74 2.21 410.33 1017
US Real Int. Rate 1.29 1.99 -1.1 4.58 1302
FDI Inows 4.47 61.29 -5.55 1660.54 735
Portfolio Inows 0.21 4.15 -94.07 20.83 589
LnBMP 2.55 1.91 -1.10 12.92 584
Political Rights 4.21 2.11 1 7 1056
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for 25 Developed Economies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
growth GDPw 1.99 1.49 -1.71 7.46 161
growth Kstockw 2.01 1.35 -0.71 9.45 161
TFP 1.39 1.30 -1.67 6.07 161
Initial GDPpc 9.51 0.74 6.97 10.78 161
Human Capital 38.28 13.24 5.80 69.60 154
G/Y 17.03 4.16 6.83 26.50 161
Financial Openness 1.33 1.35 -1.77 2.60 161
Trade Openness 62.84 45.20 10.76 279.58 161
US Real Int. Rate 1.29 1.99 -1.1 4.58 175
FDI Inows 1.83 2.49 -0.01 15.30 147
Portfolio Inows 4.39 32.40 -0.04 380.27 137
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